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This paper develops a welfare theoretic framework for interpreting evidence on 
the impacts of public programs on housing markets.  We extend Rosen’s hedonic 
model to explain how housing prices capitalize exogenous shocks to public goods 
and externalities.  The model predicts that trading between heterogeneous buyers 
and sellers will drive a wedge between these “capitalization effects” and welfare 
changes.  We test this hypothesis in the context of changes in measures of school 
quality in five metropolitan areas.  Results from boundary discontinuity designs 
suggest that capitalization effects understate parents' willingness to pay for public 
school improvements by as much as 75%. 
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In his seminal 1974 paper, Sherwin Rosen explained how market transactions can reveal 
buyers’ willingness to pay for the characteristics of a differentiated product.  Rosen’s static 
model is frequently used to assess the benefits of policies targeting public goods and exter-
nalities.  The logic is simple.  Homebuyers implicitly purchase the right to consume a bun-
dle of local public goods when they buy a house.  It follows that a hedonic price function 
for housing can be used to infer buyers’ willingness to pay for polices that would alter the 
provision of public goods.  Unfortunately, this is easier said than done.   
One of the main complications with using housing markets to infer the willingness to 
pay for public goods is that the market clearing process can present endogeneity problems 
for estimation.
2
  As heterogeneous households sort themselves across an urban area they 
also vote on the provision of local public goods, they interact with their neighbors, and 
their collective actions may increase congestion and degrade the natural environment.  
These mechanisms have the potential to confound reduced form estimators for the willing-
ness to pay by inducing correlation between the public good of interest and latent attributes 
of households and neighborhoods.  Goldstein and Pauly (1981) first called attention to this 
problem, labeling it “Tiebout bias” since it arises from the sorting mechanism in Tiebout’s 
(1956) conceptual model of residential sorting and local public goods provision.  Rubin-
feld, Shapiro, and Roberts (1987), Epple and Sieg (1999), and Epple, Romer, and Sieg 
                                                 
2 Other modeling challenges include forward looking behavior, the unknown form of the equilibrium price function, and identification 
problems with estimating demand curves for product characteristics.  For discussion of these issues see Epple 1987, Cropper, Deck, and 
McConnell 1988, Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim 2004, Kuminoff, Parmeter, and Pope 2010, Bishop and Murphy 2011, and 
Kuminoff, Smith, and Timmins 2013. 
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(2001) were among the first to develop strategies for estimating households’ preferences 
for public goods in a way that accounted for Tiebout sorting.  Subsequent studies ad-
dressed peer effects in addition to modeling sorting based on public goods (e.g. Calabrese 
et al. 2006, Bayer and Timmins 2007, Ferreyra 2007, Walsh 2007).    
A recent wave of empirical research has sought to estimate the willingness to pay for 
public goods without modeling sorting behavior by instead placing hedonic price functions 
within the econometric framework for program evaluation (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).  
This approach treats Tiebout bias as an omitted variable problem to be addressed using in-
struments, panel data, and regression discontinuity designs.  The most common strategy is 
to use a plausibly exogenous source of temporal variation in the quality of a public good to 
identify how the quality change was capitalized into housing prices.  These “capitalization 
effects” are then interpreted as welfare measures.3  Researchers have relied on this logic in 
order to draw strong conclusions about important problems such as the value of a statistical 
life (Davis 2004), the benefits of the Clean Air Act (Chay and Greenstone 2005), and 
homeowners’ willingness to pay to reduce their exposure to crime risk (Linden and 
Rockoff 2008, Pope 2008).  More generally, over the past decade the hedonic program 
evaluation framework has become a leading approach to measuring the public’s willing-
ness to pay for public goods, with numerous applications published in the top general in-
terest and field journals in economics (see Parmeter and Pope 2012 for a survey).    
                                                 
3 Consistent with recent program evaluation studies, we use the word “capitalization” to describe how shocks to amenities at a point in 
space cause prices to change over time.  This description differs from an earlier literature that used “capitalization” to describe the 
equilibrium spatial relationship between prices and amenities at a point in time (see Kanemoto 1988 for an example and references).  We 
define capitalization formally in section 2.  
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While it is routinely asserted that “capitalization effects” measure the willingness to pay 
for public goods, the recent program evaluation studies have not provided any evidence to 
support this claim.  That is, none of the studies that have interpreted capitalization effects 
as welfare measures have developed models of the capitalization process to support their 
interpretations.  In order to understand capitalization effects, one would need to use 
Rosen’s (1974) model to conduct an appropriate comparative static analysis of how chang-
es in public goods affect housing market equilibria.    
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the validity of interpreting capitalization ef-
fects as welfare measures when the price functions that clear a market for a differentiated 
good arise from the equilibrium sorting process described by Rosen.  In the first half of the 
paper we extend Rosen’s (1974) conceptual model to express the capitalization effect for a 
public good as a general function of structural parameters describing household prefer-
ences, production technology, and market institutions.  We find that the capitalization ef-
fect does not have a specific welfare interpretation in this environment.  When there is an 
exogenous shock to the spatial distribution of a public good, the gradient of the hedonic 
price function will generally adjust in order to clear the housing market.  This adjustment 
drives a wedge between the average capitalization effect and the average household’s will-
ingness to pay.   
For example, an improvement in the quality of public education will change the shadow 
price of access to public schools.  The shadow price adjusts because the demand for school 
quality is downward sloping and/or because the composition of households in a given 
neighborhood changes.  An improvement in school quality may also change what people 
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are willing to pay for complementary housing attributes such as locations near public 
parks.  The problem is that the capitalization effect conflates the public’s willingness to 
pay for the improvement in school quality with changes in the shadow prices of school 
quality and other housing attributes.  This type of conflating appears to be a general feature 
of the hedonic equilibrium model.  It even occurs in simple specifications for consumer 
preferences such as the linear-quadratic-normal model considered by Epple (1987) and 
Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004).    
In the second half of the paper we investigate the empirical implications of “conflation 
bias” in the willingness to pay for public goods.  We develop and demonstrate a methodol-
ogy for testing whether capitalization effects reveal welfare measures.  Given a parametric 
specification for the hedonic price function, we derive sufficient conditions for interpreting 
the marginal capitalization effect experienced by a household as a measure of that house-
hold’s marginal willingness to pay.  Importantly, these conditions can be tested within the 
hedonic program evaluation framework.  Our main test relies on having a research design 
for identifying the gradient of the equilibrium price function both before and after the 
shock to public goods that defines the capitalization effect.   
Our empirical demonstration of the methodology uses a boundary discontinuity design 
to estimate parents’ valuation of public school quality before and after there were large 
changes in publicly reported measures of academic performance.  This research design ex-
ploits a series of laws that create spatial discontinuities in the way that children are as-
signed to public schools.  Children living in physically similar houses in the same neigh-
borhood are sometimes assigned to different schools where students tend to score better or 
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worse on standardized exams.  These assignment laws underlie our strategy for estimating 
the shadow price of school-level academic performance.  We estimate shadow prices in 10 
housing markets:  five metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, Fairfax, and 
Portland) each observed at two points in time (2003 and 2007) that were chosen because 
they bracket substantial changes in the measures of test scores that were reported to parents 
and the general public.  Prior studies such as Black (1999) and Bayer, Ferreira, and 
McMillan (2007) have used the same research design to estimate the shadow price of pub-
lic school test scores in a single metro area at a single point in time.  Their results provide a 
baseline for comparison.  Our study is the first to provide evidence on variation in the 
shadow price of public school test scores across time and space.   
We find that the average shadow price of a 1% increase in test scores increased by 28% 
between 2003 and 2007.  This average reflects considerable heterogeneity across markets.  
Changes in the shadow prices of test scores and other housing attributes are conflated with 
homebuyers’ valuation of school quality, causing our estimates for capitalization effects to 
understate hedonic measures of the willingness to pay by as much as 75%.   
Overall, the evidence from our conceptual and empirical models suggests the bias in in-
terpreting capitalization effects as measures of the willingness to pay for public goods is of 
first-order importance.  Our work raises the bar for future research.  In order to use capital-
ization effects to draw credible inferences about consumer welfare, the analyst must first 
demonstrate that the evolution of the price function supports their interpretation.      
The next section provides context for our study and explains our research design.  Sec-
tions 3 and 4 develop our conceptual and econometric models.  Section 5 describes the ap-
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plication to school quality, section 6 presents results, and section 7 concludes.   
2. The Hedonic Method and Benefit Measurement 
2.1.  Identifying Capitalization Effects for Endogenous Public Goods 
To illustrate the issues at stake, we begin with a standard reduced-form model of the re-
lationship between housing prices and public goods.  We define public goods broadly to 
include any nonmarket goods and services conveyed to homeowners through their choice 
of a neighborhood.  Examples include local public goods (such as school quality), urban 
and environmental services (such as crime rates and air quality), and variables describing 
the demographic composition of the community (such as race and educational attainment).     
Virtually all reduced-form studies in the literature pose a version of the following model, 
 (1)    111111   hgp ,                                
where p represents the price of housing, g is the public good of interest, h represents all 
other observable attributes of houses and neighborhoods,   is an error term that arises, in 
part, due to unobserved attributes of neighborhoods, and their subscripts denote the time 
period.  With Jj ,...,1  houses and Kk ,...,1  observable attributes, 1p  and 1g  are 1Jx
vectors and 1h  is a JxK  matrix.  The elements of 1p , 1g , and 1h  are typically measured in 
levels or logs.  Finally, 1  is the parameter of interest.  We will discuss its interpretation in 
section 2.2. 
Many public goods are endogenously determined through the housing market in ways 
that are likely to induce correlation between 1g , 1h , and 1 , creating a problem for OLS 
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estimation of 1 .  For example, imagine trying to isolate the impact of registered sex of-
fenders on nearby property values.  If the sex offenders sorted themselves into subdivisions 
with higher preexisting crime rates, where housing was cheaper, then the OLS estimator 
for 1  will confound the sex offenders’ impact on property values with the impact of 
preexisting crime.  The two effects cannot be distinguished by controlling for crime be-
cause data on crime rates are generally unavailable below the level of a zip code.  This type 
of confounding is widely believed to pervade the literature.   
Recent studies have developed research designs that mitigate confounding (e.g. Black 
1999, Davis 2004, Chay and Greenstone 2005, Linden and Rockoff 2008, Pope 2008, 
Greenstone and Gallagher 2008, Baum-Snow and Marion 2009, Cellini, Ferreira, and 
Rothstein 2010).  With the exception of Black (1999), these studies exploit sources of tem-
poral variation in g.  This variation is used to estimate an econometric model specified in 
terms of fixed effects, first differences, or difference-in-differences.  For example, suppose 
p, g, and h are observed again after the distribution of g has changed.  h and   may have 
changed as well.  Differencing the data produces a panel model, 
(2)                                        hgp ,                         
where 12 ppp  , for example.  Equation (2) describes how prices adjusted to the 
change in g, controlling for concomitant changes in h.  This is the standard first differences 
model used in the literature.  Some studies also use instruments for g  to address possible 
correlation between g  and  .  Notice that the identified parameter,  , is not necessari-
ly the same as 1  in equation (1).  We refer to   as the “capitalization effect” because it 
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describes how the change in g was capitalized into housing prices.  Our interest lies in ana-
lyzing how this effect can be interpreted when (1) is the correct model. 
2.2.  The Welfare Interpretation of Capitalization Effects 
The interpretation of   begins with the interpretation of 1 .  It is standard to translate 
1  into a welfare measure by appealing to hedonic theory.  First, the price function is as-
sumed to be continuously differentiable.  Differentiating with respect to g defines the mar-
ginal price function for g.  The marginal price paid by the buyer of house j is defined by a 
 
jj gp 111 ,,  triplet.
4
  Next, buyers and sellers are assumed to satisfy the smoothness condi-
tions of Rosen’s (1974) model, including: (i) differentiability of utility functions and cost 
functions; (ii) free mobility; (iii) the ability to consume and produce continuous quantities 
of g and h; (iv) perfect information about p, g, and h; and (v) no market power on the part 
of any buyer or seller.  Under these conditions, Rosen demonstrates that the marginal price 
function for g, evaluated at jj gp 11 , , will equal the buyer’s willingness to pay for a margin-
al change in g (henceforth MWTP).   
In contrast, Rosen (1974) does not interpret  .  He considers market equilibrium, not 
the adjustment process that would follow an exogenous change in product attributes.  Stud-
ies that estimate capitalization effects have addressed this knowledge gap by assuming that 
the gradient of the price function is constant over the duration of the study period (i.e. 
21    and 21   ).  This assumption is crucial.  It allows household-specific measures 
                                                 
4 The formula for the marginal price depends on whether p and g are measured in levels or logs.  However, this distinction is not 
important for our analysis.  Our conclusions hold regardless of how the analyst chooses to scale of elements of p, g, and h.   
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of MWTP to be defined by  jj gp 11 ,,  triplets in period 1 and by  jj gp 22 ,,  triplets in 
period 2.  These definitions follow from the interpretation of 1  and simple algebra.
5
  If we 
instead consider the fixed-effects or difference-in-difference or instrumental variables ana-
logs to (2), we reach the same conclusion:  The assumption of a time-constant gradient is 
crucial to the analyst’s ability to translate the identified parameters of the econometric 
model into welfare measures.     
Recent studies have used the time-constant gradient assumption (henceforth TCGA) to 
translate capitalization effects into welfare measures for changes in cancer risk (Davis 
2004), crime risk (Linden and Rockoff 2008, Pope 2008), hazardous waste (Greenstone 
and Gallagher 2008), invasive species (Horsch and Lewis 2009), investment in education 
(Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein 2010), low income housing credits (Baum-Snow and Mar-
ion 2009), open space (Bin, Landry, and Meyer 2009), and particulate matter (Chay and 
Greenstone 2005) to list only a few.
6
  In these studies, the gradient is assumed to be fixed 
for 10 to 20 years, spanning large changes in g, h, and potentially  .7     
Given the importance of developing credible estimates of MWTP for public goods, it is 
surprising how little is known about the evolution of hedonic price functions.  None of the 
                                                 
5 Write the period 2 price function as
222222   hgp .  Subtracting the period 1 price function from the period 2 price function 
reduces to the capitalization model in (2) as long as 
21    and 21   .  Thus, 21   .   
6 For example, Chay and Greenstone (2005, p.418) conclude that their analysis “demonstrates that quasi-experimental approaches can be 
effective in estimating parameters derived from economic models (e.g. MWTP)” and that welfare calculations based on their estimates 
for capitalization effects, “suggest that the mid-1970s TSPs nonattainment designation provided a $45 billion aggregate gain to 
homeowners in nonattainment counties.”   
7 The length of the study period and the sizes of the changes in variable are typically dictated by the instruments needed to support the 
analyst’s preferred identification strategy.   
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studies invoking TCGA have tested it or provided evidence to validate it.  Nor can we find 
any prior studies that explain what (if anything) must by assumed about preferences in or-
der to guarantee that a hedonic gradient will be invariant to the types of changes in public 
goods, wealth, and information that occur over 10-20 year periods. 
2.3.  Related Evidence from Previous Studies 
Three sets of studies have considered issues that relate to our research question.  First, 
theory papers by Lind (1973) and Starrett (1981) ask whether a policy that alters the distri-
bution of a public good will produce changes in land values that reveal the social benefits 
of the policy.  Their answer is ‘no’, not if heterogeneous households react to the policy by 
moving.  Sieg et al. (2004) reach the same conclusion in a numerical simulation.  One 
might expect their common finding—that price changes do not reveal welfare effects—to 
extend to our hedonic setting.  However, this is an intuitive leap.  The models developed 
by Lind, Starrett, and Sieg et al. relax some of the smoothness conditions that support equi-
libria with a one-to-one mapping between marginal prices and MWTP in Rosen’s model.  
Therefore, their results do not have direct implications for the relationship between capital-
ization and MWTP in environments based on Rosen (1974). 
Second, Palmquist (1988, 1992) considers how hedonic price functions could be used to 
measure welfare effects for changes in environmental quality.  His 1988 paper explains 
how Hicksian welfare measures could, in principle, be constructed from data on an indi-
vidual’s choices before and after a quality change, if such data were available and if it were 
possible to identify price functions before and after the change.  In the special case where 
the change is “localized”, Palmquist (1992) conjectures that it might be possible to con-
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struct welfare measures from the ex-ante price function.
8
  Neither paper addresses the as-
sumptions needed to support TCGA; nor do they consider whether it is possible to recover 
MWTP from data on price changes following a non-marginal change in quality.       
Finally, a few empirical studies have reported evidence of temporal instability in the pa-
rameters used to characterize gradients of housing price functions.  For example, Brook-
shire et al. (1985) found that a shock to information about earthquake risk changed the im-
plicit price of earthquake risk over a 6-year period, and Beron, Murdoch, and Thayer 
(2001) reported annual changes in the implicit price of visibility in Los Angeles between 
1980 and 1995.  However, the evidence from these studies looks dubious when viewed 
through the lens of the modern program evaluation literature.  The problem is that their 
research designs do not use modern tools for addressing omitted variables.   
2.4.  Our Research Design 
A direct way to test the hypothesis of a time-constant gradient is to identify single-
period price functions before and after a change in the distribution of public goods.  While 
there is no methodological panacea for overcoming omitted variable bias in cross-section 
data, Sandra Black’s (1999) boundary discontinuity design is generally viewed as a credi-
ble strategy for mitigating the problem.  For example, Greenstone and Gallagher (2008 
p.997) include it among their short list of papers “demonstrating that it is possible to iden-
                                                 
8 By “localized”, Palmquist means that the quality change has no impact on the equilibrium price function.  Subsequent to Palmquist’s 
work, it has been recognized that localized changes can trigger tipping effects via Tiebout sorting that produce large changes in 
equilibria (Sethi and Somathathan 2004, Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008, Banzhaf and Walsh 2013).  For example, Banzhaf and Walsh 
(2008) find that increasing emissions of toxic air pollutants alters neighborhood demographics by increasing emigration in general and 
increasing emigration of wealthier households in particular.    
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tify research designs that mitigate the confounding that has historically undermined the 
credibility of conventional hedonic approaches to valuing nonmarket goods.” 9     
Black (1999) used spatial discontinuities in the laws assigning children to public schools 
to identify the impact of standardized test scores on property values in the Boston suburbs 
in the early 1990s.
 
 While there have been many subsequent applications of her methodol-
ogy, to our knowledge none have tracked how the implicit price of test scores on property 
values has evolved over time.  Nor has any study compared multiple markets at the same 
point in time.  We extend this literature by estimating 10 hedonic price functions, describ-
ing five metropolitan areas, each observed during two years: 2003 and 2007.  This period 
brackets significant changes in the spatial distribution of publicly reported measures of 
school quality.  Details of the data and application begin in section 5.  Now we develop the 
conceptual model. 
3. Hedonic Equilibria and the Capitalization of Market Shocks 
This section reviews the primitives of Rosen’s model in the context of a housing market, 
characterizes equilibrium, and defines restrictions on preferences and technology that 
guarantee the marginal price schedule will be unaffected by exogenous changes in non-
market attributes of a private good. 
3.1.  Demand, Supply, and Market Equilibrium 
Price-taking households are assumed to be free to choose a house with any combination 
of physical attributes (e.g. bedrooms, bathrooms, sqft) in the neighborhood that provides 
                                                 
9 Similar opinions are expressed through the discussion of Black’s work in quasi-experimental hedonic studies such as Cellini, Ferreira, 
and Rothstein (2010), Chay and Greenstone (2005), Linden and Rockoff (2008), and Pope (2008).  
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their desired bundle of public goods.  The model is static so that consumers are assumed to 
be myopic with respect to the future evolution of prices and public goods.
10
  The utility 
maximization problem is  




subject to:  ;, xgPby  ,           
where x is a vector containing all attributes of houses and neighborhoods, other than g.  
Thus x includes the elements of h along with any omitted variables that enter the error term 
in the estimator for the hedonic price function in (1).  A household chooses levels of attrib-
utes and the composite good (b) to maximize utility, given its preferences ( ), income ( y
), and the after-tax price of housing,  ;, xgP , which is expressed as a general parametric 
function of g, x, and a parameter vector,  .  The first order conditions are  
























for Kk ,...,1 .      
Equation (4a) implies that each household will choose a neighborhood that provides a 
quantity of g at which their willingness to pay for an additional unit equals its marginal 
implicit price.  Equation (4b) states the analogous condition for physical housing attributes. 
Let  ;,, xmgC  denote a producer’s cost function, where m is the number of houses the 
producer sells and   is a vector of parameters describing the producer’s idiosyncratic 
                                                 
10 Recent studies have begun to consider how forward looking behavior may affect the estimation of structural models of the sorting 
process (e.g. Bayer et al. 2011, Bishop and Murphy 2011).  The implications for reduced form estimation of price functions have yet to 
be determined.  This is an important area for further research.   
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costs.  Following Rosen, we treat each producer as a price taker who specializes in produc-
ing exactly one housing type but is free to vary the number of units sold.  For convenience, 
g  is treated as exogenous.11  In this case, the profit maximization problem is   




 ,    
with the corresponding first order conditions 











;, ,      
















 for Kk ,...,1 . 
Producers choose m to set the offer price of the marginal house equal to its production cost, 
and they choose x to set the marginal per unit cost of each attribute equal to its implicit 
price. 
The primitives of the model include the distribution of consumer types,  ,yR , the 
distribution of producer types,  S , and the spatial distribution of the public good,  gT .  
Equilibrium occurs when the first order conditions in (4) and (6) are simultaneously satis-
fied for all consumers and producers.  This system of differential equations implicitly de-
fines the equilibrium hedonic price function that clears the market.  It will be useful to re-
write the price function to acknowledge its dependence on model primitives: 
(7)                 cbaxgPxgP ,,; ,;,   ,                
where a, b, and c are parameter vectors describing the distributions of consumers, produc-
                                                 
11 The results of this section are not altered by making g endogenous or x exogenous.  We need only assume that g may be influenced by 
forces that are exogenous to the model.  
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ers, and the public good:   ayR ~, ,   bS ~ , and   cgT ~ .12  Importantly, the reduced 
form parameters describing the shape of the price function are endogenously determined 
by the structural parameters.  It follows that shocks to the distributions of income and pref-
erences, technology, or public goods may change the shape of the price function which, in 
turn, will change the implicit price schedule for g.     
3.2.   Interpreting Capitalization Effects as Welfare Measures 
Now we depart from Rosen to consider equilibria in the same geographic market, before 
and after an exogenous shock to  gT .  The change in the value of a particular house j de-
pends on the difference in the pre and post-shock price functions,   
(8)          1111122222 ,,; ,,,;, cbaxgPcbaxgP jjjj   ,        
where the subscripts denote pre and post-shock equilibria.  To isolate the capitalization ef-
fect for house j, we condition on x and divide the change in P by the change in g, 
(9)     












 .            
This difference quotient provides a general expression for the parameter estimated in the 
hedonic program evaluation literature. 
Because j  depends on two (potentially different) price functions, it is not the measure 
                                                 
12 The distribution of physical housing types (i.e. x-types) is also an equilibrium outcome of this model.  Since its distribution just 
depends on model primitives, we suppress it to avoid clutter.  Alternatively, (7) could be written as    cbadcbaxgP ,,,,,; ,  , 
where the vector d describes the distribution of housing types.   
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of MWTP from Rosen (1974).  To convert j  into MWTP, we must restrict preferences 
and technology to assure that the capitalization effect will equal the partial derivative of the 
pre-shock and/or post-shock price functions.  Severity of the restriction depends on the size 
of the shock.  If the change in the distribution of g is small, then we need only restrict 
21 aa   and 21 bb  .  Under this condition, the difference quotient in (9) approaches the 
partial derivative in (4a) as jj gg 12   approaches zero for all j.
13
  In the limit, pre-shock 
MWTP equals post-shock MWTP which equals the capitalization effect.  This is intuitive.  
An infinitesimal change in a single attribute will not alter the shape of the hedonic price 
function; equilibrium prices will simply increase by MWTP.  This special case is con-
sistent with Palmquist’s (1992) characterization of localized externalities.   
However, as noted earlier, empirical studies typically analyze large shocks.  In this case, 
three restrictions are jointly sufficient to establish a welfare interpretation for the capitali-
zation effect.  We state this formally as     
ASSUMPTION 1.    
i.  21 aa     and    21 bb  . 
  ii.      ,;, xfgxgP  . 
iii.  0 g . 
Condition (i) restricts preferences, income, and technology to be constant over the duration 
of the study.  Condition (ii) implicitly restricts the shapes of supply and demand curves so 
that the marginal price of g does not depend on its level.  Condition (iii) further restricts 
                                                 
13 Proof of this statement follows immediately from the definition of a derivative. 
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supply and demand such that changes in g do not affect the hedonic gradient.  We discuss 
violations of each condition after proving the theorem.   
THEOREM 1.  If assumption 1 holds for a shock to g, then the capitalization effect,  , 
reveals the pre-shock MWTP, which equals the post-shock MWTP.   
Proof.  Consider any house, j, with characteristics xx j   for which jg  changes from 
1jg  to 2jg .  Since 21 aa  , 21 bb  , and 0 g , we know that 21   .  Combining 
this result with the assumption that   gxgP  ;,   ,xf  implies  1,xf   2,xf .  
It follows from the Mean Value Theorem that  1, xfj   2,xf .  The second term 
measures pre-shock MWTP and the third term measures post-shock MWTP, as defined by 
the first-order conditions from Rosen (1974).  QED. 
Alternatively, if assumption 1 is violated, the Mean Value Theorem generally implies
    gxgPgxgP jjjjj  222111 ;,;,  .   
For example, suppose conditions (ii) and (iii) hold, but the shock to  gT  coincides with a 
shock to income or information, changing what households are willing to pay for g.  This 
example violates condition (i).  Since the parameters defining the hedonic gradient depend 
on preferences and income, 2  may differ from 1 , causing the hedonic gradient to adjust, 
driving a wedge between the capitalization effect and MWTP.   
All else constant, the credibility of condition (i) declines as periods 1 and 2 grow further 
apart.  The more time passes the greater the scope for preferences, income, and technology 
to change in ways that alter the market-clearing price function.  Notice that the shock to 
 gT  need not be large to produce a large wedge between capitalization and MWTP.  Even 
18 
 
in the special case where the shock is marginal and localized, 21 aa   or 21 bb   can invali-
date a welfare interpretation of a capitalization effect. 
Now suppose conditions (i) and (iii) hold so that the price function is stable (i.e. 21 aa  , 
21 bb  , and 21   ).  Condition (ii) restricts the curvature of its gradient.  This restriction 
avoids problems that can occur if the gradient depends on g.  To see this, notice that 
movement along a nonlinear price function will generally change marginal prices.  If an 
increase from 1jg  to 2jg  corresponds to a change in its price, then the capitalization effect 
cannot simultaneously equal ex ante MWTP and ex post MWTP, since the two measures 
of MWTP differ.
14
  The strength of condition (ii) is underscored by Ekeland, Heckman, 
and Nesheim’s (2004) finding that the hedonic gradient is generically nonlinear in g.   
Finally, consider condition (iii).  The only obvious restriction on market primitives that 
supports 0 g  is that the demand for g is perfectly elastic.  If the demand is down-
ward sloping, then a positive shock to g will decrease individual MWTP (changing  ).  
Utility should also be separable in g and x.  Otherwise, a shock to the distribution of g 
could change the implicit prices of the elements of x.  If g is the crime rate, for example, 
we must be willing to assume that changes in crime do not affect the willingness to pay for 
security systems, fences, or proximity to city parks.  These restrictions on own and cross-
price elasticities also apply to elements of x that are subject to exogenous shocks.  A 
                                                 
14 Empirical capitalization studies typically assume  gP .  If the standard model were generalized to allow for heterogeneous 
local average capitalization effects, then condition (ii) could also be relaxed.  For example, if equation (2) were to include polynomial 
functions of g , then condition (ii) would adjust to match the highest order polynomial; e.g.     ,;, 22 xfgxgP   in the 
case of a quadratic.  We thank a referee for pointing this out. 
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change in the relative price of any attribute violates 0 g  and can drive a wedge be-
tween MWTP and the capitalization effect for any other attribute.   
Conditions (i)-(iii) are obviously strong restrictions.  They seem unlikely to be satisfied 
in most applications.  If they are violated, then the hedonic gradient may be unstable, pro-
ducing a wedge between the identified capitalization effect and the policy-relevant meas-
ure of MWTP.
15
  We illustrate this with a brief example using a version of Tinbergen’s 
(1959) linear-quadratic-normal model.     
3.3.  Example: Linear-Quadratic-Normal Model  
Suppose the housing stock is fixed, utility is quadratic, and preferences and housing 
characteristics are normally distributed.  These assumptions conveniently yield a closed-
form linear expression for the equilibrium price function (Tinbergen 1959, Epple 1987).  
Specifically, define the utility from a house with attributes  xgk ,  as 




,                 
where   is a positive definite diagonal scaling matrix.  When k  and   are both normally 
distributed such that  kkNk  ,~  and    ,~ N , the price function can be ex-
pressed as  
                                                 
15 As noted earlier the three conditions are sufficient, but they are not strictly necessary.  It is possible to construct examples where 
simultaneous violations of two or more conditions are exactly offsetting.  This should not diminish their importance.  To provide an 
analogy: selecting the right empirical specification and valid instruments is sufficient, but not necessary to identify causal parameters in 
applications of the instrumental variables model.  It is possible to construct examples where the bias from invalid instruments is exactly 
offset by biases from measurement error.  This certainly does not diminish the importance of omitted variable bias. 
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(11)          kkkP
2

  , where  kk   5.05.0    and    5.05.0 kI   .       
Notice that the reduced-form parameters describing the shape of the price function 
  ,  are themselves functions of the structural parameters describing the distributions 
of household preferences    ,  and housing characteristics  kk  , .  The structure of 
this simple model clearly violates the last two conditions of Assumption 1.   
Now consider a shock to g .  Before the shock, kMWTP 111   .  After the shock, 
kMWTP 222   .  It follows from (11) that, in general, 21    and 21    so that 
21 MWTPMWTP  .  The rate at which the shock is capitalized into property values is 
(12)          























 .               
Hence 1MWTP , 2MWTP , and approximations to MWTP based on   will generally differ, 
with the signs and magnitudes of these differences depending on the values of the structur-
al parameters and the change in g .16   
While the parametric structure of the linear-quadratic-normal model helps to illustrate 
the mechanics underlying conflation bias, program evaluation studies in the hedonic litera-
ture aim to avoid making explicit parametric assumptions about consumer preferences by 
instead assuming a parametric form for the equilibrium price function.  We follow this ap-
proach in the next section, deriving an expression for conflation bias in terms of the data 
and parameters of a standard reduced form model. 
                                                 
16 We provide numerical examples in the supplemental appendix. 
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4. Sufficient Conditions for Capitalization Based Welfare Measurement 
The linear price functions that describe market equilibria before and after an unexpected 
shock to the distribution of g are 111111   hgp  and 222222   hgp .  Recall 
that h represents the subset of housing attributes observed by the analyst ( xh  ), while 
the econometric error term,  , captures the effect of unobserved attributes.  Parameter sub-
scripts recognize that the shape of the function may have been altered by the shock to pub-
lic goods and by concomitant changes in h,  ,  ,yR , and  . S   Note that we do not 
take a stance on approximation error in the use of a linear functional form.
17
  Since virtual-
ly all empirical studies use linear models, doing so here allows us to focus attention on the 
relationship between capitalization and MWTP.  The results in this section should be 
viewed as a best-case scenario where the price function is specified correctly.      
Subtracting the old price function from the new one yields a general time-differenced 
model, 
(13)            11221122 hhggp .        
In the special case where 21    and 21   , equation (13) reduces to the standard first-
differenced estimator from (2).  Alternatively, if 21    but we restrict 1122  hh   then 
(13) reduces to a simple Oaxaca decomposition:   12 ggp .   
More generally, we can apply the Frisch-Waugh Theorem to write the relationship be-
tween the estimator for the capitalization effect ( ˆ ) and the price function parameters de-
                                                 
17 For discussions of hedonic functional form see Cropper, Deck, and McConnell (1988), Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), and 
Kuminoff, Parmeter, and Pope (2010). 
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scribing MWTP ( 21, ) as:  






















ˆ ,             
where   ghhhhgr  1 .  Let z  denote a valid instrument for g .  The IV ana-
log to (14) simply replaces the g ’s in r with   gzzzzg  1ˆ .   
Equation (14) reports what we can expect to learn about MWTP from estimating (2) 
when (13) is the true model.  The IV estimator for the capitalization effect, IVˆ , depends on 
all of the parameters of the price functions that precede and follow the shock, as well as 
correlations between levels and changes in housing characteristics.  The first term to the 
right of the equality in (14) is a parameter defining MWTP in the new equilibrium.
18
  The 
second term is a “price effect” arising from a change in the implicit price of g.  The third 
term is a “substitution effect” arising from changes in the implicit prices of other housing 
attributes that affect utility and, in some sense, serve as substitutes for g.  The last term re-
flects the bias from correlation between changes in observed and unobserved variables.   
The implicit price and substitution effects arise when the hedonic price function acts as 
the market clearing mechanism that Rosen described, adjusting to clear the market follow-
ing the change in  gT  and any concomitant changes in market primitives.  Summing the 
price and substitution effects defines the conflation bias in interpreting a capitalization ef-
fect as a parameter of a hedonic price function.  The direction of the bias is indeterminate.  
                                                 
18 Applying Rosen’s FOC to the price function defines MWTP for the occupant of house j by a  jj gp 222 ,,
 
triplet, with the exact 
formula determined by the scaling of the variables in the hedonic price function. 
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Using IVˆ  to predict MWTP at a house j may produce an estimate that falls outside the 
range of values for the true MWTP for the occupants of j in the pre-shock and post-shock 
equilibria.
19,20
  To establish a mapping between capitalization effects and welfare 
measures, some additional restrictions will be needed.    
At least two sets of conditions are sufficient to translate capitalization effects into 
MWTP.  The first set of conditions follows directly from assumption 1.  If assumption 1 is 
satisfied, the hedonic gradient must be time-constant.  Adding the usual orthogonality re-
striction on the econometric error term gives us   
(15) SUFFICIENT CONDITION 1.    21   ,  21   ,    and   hz, .        
Under these restrictions, equation (14) reduces to 21
ˆ  IV .  In this case the capitaliza-
tion model (2) can be used to develop an unbiased estimator of ex ante MWTP which 
equals ex post MWTP.  If estimation of single-period price functions is possible, the time-
constant gradient assumption can be tested. 
The second set of conditions replaces TCGA with additional restrictions on the data.  It 
can be seen from (14) that 2
ˆ  IV  under the following conditions  
                                                 
19 For example, consider a quality improvement that decreases MWTP without affecting the control variables or their marginal prices.  In 
this case, (14) implies that 
12
ˆ    if 01  gg .  Alternatively, 
ˆ
12   if 1gggg  .   
20 From the perspective of welfare measurement, conflation bias is more problematic than the standard complications with interpreting 
local average treatment effects (LATE).  In the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects, LATE can identify parameters that are 
“structural” in the sense that they are invariant to policy changes operating through z (see Heckman 2010).  In contrast, capitalization 
effects for public goods are not policy invariant.  The market clearing function of the hedonic gradient makes capitalization effects en-




(16) SUFFICIENT CONDITION 2.    zhhg ,, 11     and   hz, .            
If the instrument is randomized in the sense that it is orthogonal to the initial level of the 
public good, and to the initial levels of the control variables, and to changes in those varia-
bles, then the capitalization effect identifies MWTP in the post-shock equilibrium, even if 
the gradient changes.
21
  This identification argument is implicit in regression discontinuity 
designs such as Greenstone and Gallagher (2008), where the instrument is a policy that in-
duces a g  “treatment” for observations that lie above a certain 1g  threshold.  If treatment 
is randomized with respect to 1h  and h , then focusing on observations in a very small 
neighborhood around the threshold may approximately identify ex post MWTP.    
However, the policy relevance of ex post MWTP still depends on the nature of the in-
strument and the evolution of the hedonic gradient.  For example, consider a policy that 
produces a large improvement in g , driving MWTP to zero.  Knowing 2  (but not 1 ) 
does not allow us to distinguish the hypothesis that people were made better off by the pol-
icy from the alternative hypothesis that people were indifferent to the improvement that 
occurred.  Now imagine a second random event causes g  to deteriorate, increasing 
MWTP.  Data from periods two and three could be combined to recover 3 .  In principle, 
2  and 3  could be used to develop a linear approximation to a MWTP function for g , 
                                                 
21 The requirement that z be orthogonal to h  arises because of the potential endogeneity of h  in equation (2) when (13) is the true 
model (e.g. h  may be correlated with the 
1h  term that is omitted from (2)).  It follows that if z is correlated with some of the elements 
of h  then the IV capitalization model will generally provide an inconsistent estimator for ex post MWTP.  Condition (16) can be 
relaxed to allow correlation between z and h  if additional instruments are available for the endogenous elements of h , consistent 
with the usual logic for two stage least squares estimation with multiple endogenous variables. 
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providing a more credible foundation for policy analysis.
22
   
In summary, equations (15)-(16) define sufficient conditions for translating capitaliza-
tion effects into welfare measures.
23
  Econometric consistency is established, in part, 
through an assumption of temporal stability in the hedonic gradient.  If this assumption is 
valid, then the identified parameters can be translated into ex-ante MWTP, which equals 
ex-post MWTP.  If the gradient changes but an instrument randomizes the public goods 
treatment, then a capitalization effect can be translated into ex-post MWTP.  Yet, the scope 
for using ex-post MWTP in policy evaluations depends on the evolution of the gradient.  
Thus, studying the evolution of price functions is essential to understanding the mapping 
between capitalization effects and the willingness to pay for public goods.     
5. Evidence on the Evolution of Hedonic Price Functions  
The 40-year history of research on valuing school quality is a microcosm for the broader 
literature on using housing markets to value public goods.
24
  Because a household’s access 
to a public school has traditionally been determined by whether the household lives in the 
attendance zone for that school, property values should reflect what parents are willing to 
pay for their children to attend schools where students score higher on standardized tests.
25
  
                                                 
22 The approach suggested here would serve as a quasi-experimental analog to Palmquist’s (1988) proposal for using hedonic price 
functions to calculate welfare measures for quality changes. 
23 This is similar to Chetty’s (2009) “sufficient statistics” for quasi-experimental welfare measurement 
24 Kain and Quigley (1975) is among the early contributions.  Recent applications include Downes and Zabel (2002), Figlio and Lucas 
(2004), Reback (2005), and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007). 
25 The American Housing Survey provides strong evidence that school quality affects where many movers decide to live.  Between 14% 
and 18% of recent homebuyers surveyed between 2003 and 2007 specifically cited “good schools” as one of the reasons they chose to 
move into their neighborhood.  A steady 7% cited good schools as the main reason. 
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Early studies appeared to confirm this intuition.  Then researchers noted a potential source 
of confounding—schools with higher test scores tend to be located in more exclusive 
neighborhoods.  Subsequent studies refined the research design to mitigate confounding 
from omitted neighborhood amenities.  This work began with Black (1999).  She argued 
that school quality shifts discretely as one crosses an attendance zone boundary, but other 
amenities do not.  Therefore, the composite price effect of all unobserved amenities that 
are common to houses on both sides of a boundary can be absorbed by a fixed effect for 
the “boundary zone”.  By focusing on sales that occurred near a boundary and including 
fixed effects for each boundary zone, Black forced the identification to come from price 
differentials between similar houses located on opposite sides of a boundary.   
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) refined Black’s approach to control for correla-
tion between preferences for schools and preferences for the demographic characteristics 
of one’s neighbors.  The problem stems from sorting.  If preferences for school quality are 
correlated with demographic characteristics, such as race or education, then similar types 
of households will tend to locate in the same attendance zones.  This helps to explain why 
neighborhood racial composition also tends to shift discretely as one crosses an attendance 
zone boundary.  Since prospective homebuyers may care about the characteristics of their 
neighbors, one must control for the demographic composition of the neighborhood in order 
to isolate the implicit value of academic performance.
26
         
We use the boundary discontinuity design for valuing school quality to estimate single-
year price functions for five metropolitan areas at five-year intervals.  Then we calculate 
                                                 
26 In addition to refining Black’s (1999) reduced-form estimation strategy, Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) also develop and 
estimate a random utility model of sorting behavior. 
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MWTP for school quality in each year, test TCGA, and compare estimates for MWTP to 
capitalization effects following changes in test scores that occurred over the first four years 
of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).  Throughout the application, we follow the data 
collection and econometric procedures outlined by Black (1999) and Bayer, Ferreiria, and 
McMillan (2007).  Readers are referred to their papers for additional background.  The re-
mainder of this section briefly summarizes NCLB and the data sets we have assembled. 
5.1.  No Child Left Behind 
The No Child Left Behind Act was one of the most sweeping reforms in the recent his-
tory of public education.  Beginning in 2003, it required states to implement accountability 
systems that measure student performance in reading and math.  Standardized testing is 
done in grades 3 through 8 and at least once during high school.  State test scores are used 
to determine if each school is making “adequate yearly progress” toward the goal of having 
every student attain state-specific standards for minimum competency in reading and math 
by 2014.  Schools that do not make adequate yearly progress face a series of repercussions.   
While test scores have trended up since NCLB was enacted, its impact on the quality of 
education has been debated.  Advocates argue that school quality will be improved by 
tracking performance, publicizing results, and sanctioning poorly performing schools.  
Critics argue that NCLB creates perverse incentives to teach to the test, to lower standards, 
to expel poorly performing students, or even lie when reporting scores.  Several authors 
have investigated these issues.  The emerging consensus seems to be that NCLB has im-
proved performance, despite its flaws.  For example, Dee and Jacob (2011) identify the 
impact of NCLB on test scores from the National Assessment of Education Progress 
28 
 
(NAEP).  A key feature of their research design is that changes in NAEP scores should be 
unaffected by the perverse incentives of NCLB.  They find that NCLB produced large and 




 graders, especially in the bottom decile of 
the achievement distribution.
27
  These results suggest that the upward trend in NCLB 
scores is consistent with alternative metrics for judging school quality. 
NCLB scores are the official source of public information about school quality, and they 
are easily observed.  Every school is required to track the share of its students who achieve 
proficiency in each subject.  Results are mailed to parents and posted on websites such as 
greatschools.org.  
5.2.  Ten Boundary Discontinuity Designs 
We estimate housing price functions for the metropolitan areas of Portland OR, Fairfax 
County VA, Philadelphia PA, Detroit MI, and Los Angeles CA during the 2003 and 2007 
school years.  After an exhaustive search over prospective study areas, these five were cho-
sen because they had: (i) a large number of boundary zones; (ii) a large number of housing 
transactions; and (iii) data on NCLB scores in 2003 and 2007.
28
 
Black (1999) and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) used elementary school attend-
ance zones as the basis for identification.  We use this same approach in Fairfax and Port-
land, where children are still assigned to schools based on the attendance zones where their 
parents live.  However, school-specific assignment is no longer the norm.  Since the mid-
                                                 
27 Mean increases in the NAEP math test scores were approximately 1-8 points from the start of NCLB to 2007 for 4th and 8th grade math 
scores.  In a related study, Neal and Schanzenbach (2011) find that NCLB increased reading and math scores for fifth graders in the 
middle of the achievement distribution in the Chicago Public School system.   
28 States were not required to start reporting test scores until 2006.  Some states did not report scores in 2003. 
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1990s, there has been an explosion of state and local regulations mandating “open enroll-
ment” at the school district level.  In an open enrollment area, parents are free to send their 
children to any public school within the district.  There is evidence that parents take ad-
vantage of these laws by sending their children to schools outside the zone where their 
house is located (Reback 2005).  Philadelphia, Detroit, and Los Angeles all have open en-
rollment policies.  For these areas, our identification strategy is based on the relationship 
between property values and test scores on opposite sides of district boundaries.
 29
  
Implementing the boundary discontinuity design at the district level requires taking a 
weighted average over the scores in each district.  This has the advantage of smoothing 
over idiosyncratic variability in annual school-specific scores.  Yet, it also requires extra 
caution.  Property tax rates can vary discretely across districts.  District boundaries may 
also be more likely than attendance zone boundaries to overlap with features of the urban 
landscape.  Therefore, we control for property tax rates and we use visual inspection to ex-
clude boundaries that overlap with landscape features such as rivers and highways. 
5.3.   Data and Summary Statistics 
We assembled data on test scores, neighborhood characteristics, and houses sold during 
the 2003 and 2007 school years.
30
  The scores that we use are combined rates of math and 
                                                 
29 Dhar and Ross (2009) discuss tradeoffs between studying attendance zone boundaries and district boundaries.  For example, district 
boundaries may have the advantage of being perceived as more permanent by homebuyers, but they are also more likely to overlap with 
property tax rates and neighborhood demographics, underscoring the importance of controlling for these variables in a regression.  While 
interesting, the distinction between attendance zone and district boundaries does not affect our main empirical findings.    
30 The 2003 school year is defined as October 1, 2003 through September 30, 2004, and the 2007 school year is defined as October 1, 
2007 through September 30, 2008.  These definitions reflect the fact that NCLB scores and school grades for the preceding year are 
typically announced at the end of August or the beginning of September.  Thus we want to allow time for our proxy for school quality—
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reading proficiency reported by states under NCLB.  We matched each housing sale with 
lagged scores for the relevant school or school district.
31
   Houses sold during the 2003 
school year were matched with scores from the 2002 school year, for example.  We will 
refer to the lagged scores as the “2003 score” and “2007 score” from here on.  







 percentiles of schools in each study area.  In Fairfax, for example, math/reading scores 
in the bottom 10
th
 percentile increased by an average of 11 points (or 14%) with a standard 
deviation of 8 points.  The corresponding changes for the other four areas are all positive 
and typically large.
32
  There are smaller gains (and even losses) at the middle and 90
th
 per-
centiles.  These statistics are consistent with Dee and Jacob’s (2011) finding that NCLB 
had the biggest impact on schools that began the program with the lowest scores.   
<<  Insert Table 1 Around Here >> 
The remaining components of the data were collected from various sources.  Sale prices 
and physical attributes of every house sold during the 2003 and 2007 school years were 
purchased from DataQuick.  Tax rates were calculated using assessment data from public 
records.  Finally, each house was matched with data on the demographic composition of 
residents living in the Census block group.
33
 
                                                                                                                                                    
test scores—to influence home buying decisions. 
31 The school quality information was obtained from www.schooldatadirect.org.  The combined measure of reading and math is an 
overall measure (calculated by Standard & Poor’s) that provides an average of the proficiency rates achieved across all reading and math 
tests, weighted by the number of tests taken for each school or school district. 
32 Scores are not directly comparable across study areas because each state has its own testing system.   
33 Annual block group data were obtained from Geolytics.  Their data are developed using information from the decennial Census, 
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Table 2 reports summary statistics for Fairfax County, VA.  Columns 1-2 report means 
and standard deviations for every variable in the final data set.  In 2003 the average house 
sold for approximately $567,000.  By 2007 the price had dropped slightly to $563,000.  
Over this same period, the average test score rose from 83.56 to 84.36.
34
  This small 
change in the average masks considerable heterogeneity across schools (table 1).  The av-
erage house was 34 years old, with 4 bedrooms, 3 baths, and 2,100 square feet of living 
area on a 0.4 acre lot.  It was located in a block group where 23% of the neighborhood was 
nonwhite, 24% was under 18 years of age, 85% of houses were owner occupied, 1% of 
houses were vacant, and 0.37 was the normalized measure of population density.  The av-
erage ratio of assessed to taxed value called a “tax rate” was 112.   
<<  Insert Table 2 Around Here >> 
Columns 3-5 summarize the subsample that we use in the boundary discontinuity re-
gressions.  Column 3 reports means over houses located within 0.2 miles of a boundary.  
While this cuts the sample in half, there are almost no changes in the characteristics of the 
average house (comparing columns 1 and 3).  Column 4 reports the difference in mean 
characteristics of houses located on the “high score” and “low score” sides of a boundary, 
and column 5 reports T-statistics on the differences.  Differences in scores are large and 
statistically significant whereas differences in housing characteristics tend to be small and 
insignificant.  Like Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007), we find differences in the racial 
                                                                                                                                                    
annual Census surveys, postal records, and actuarial tables of births and deaths.   
34 The mean 2003 score is slightly different than the corresponding mean in Table 1.  This is because Table 2 scores are weighted by 
enrollment whereas Table 1 is weighted by housing transactions.  
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composition of homeowners on the high and low-score sides of a boundary.  This under-
scores the importance of controlling for demographics during the estimation. 
Columns 6-7 report means and standard deviations for the average house in each Census 
block group.  Because there are too few repeated sales of individual houses to estimate a 
first differenced model using micro data, we use the block group data to estimate capitali-
zation effects for changes in test scores between 2003 and 2007.  Notice that aggregation 
does not substantially change the summary statistics relative to the micro data.  Finally, 
columns 8-9 report correlations between the changes in test scores and levels and changes 
in all other variables.    
The Fairfax county data illustrate several features that are also common to the data for 
Portland, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Los Angeles: (i) variable means are very similar across 
the full micro, 0.2 mile micro, and block group samples in each metro area; (ii) test scores 
and racial composition both tend to change discretely across boundaries; (iii) changes in 
test scores are negatively correlated with the baseline level of test scores; and (iv) changes 
in test scores are generally correlated with levels and changes in other housing characteris-
tics.  Summary statistics for each area are provided in the online appendix.   
6.  Results 
6.1.  Single-Year Hedonic Regressions 
After pooling data from 2003 and 2007, we estimate the following specification for the 
hedonic price function: 
(17)                                                               ,    
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where    denotes the log of the NCLB test score for the year prior to the sale of house j,    
is an indicator that equals 1 if the sale occurred in 2007,    is a vector containing the phys-
ical attributes of house j along with its neighborhood demographics and tax rate, and 
        and         are year-specific boundary fixed effects.  The boundary regions are 
0.2 mile areas that overlap adjacent attendance zones (Fairfax, Portland) or districts (Phila-
delphia, Detroit, Los Angeles).
35
  Notice that equation (17) allows the price function gradi-
ent to change between 2003 and 2007.  In the special case where the gradient is time con-
stant,          .  An F-test of this hypothesis provides a formal test of TCGA. 
We begin by using the sample of houses that sold within 0.2 miles of a boundary.  Pan-
els A and B of table 3 report OLS estimates of   and 07  from regressions with and with-
out boundary fixed effects.  Since NCLB scores are measured in logs, their coefficients are 
elasticities.  For example, the results in column 2 indicate that the prices of houses sold in 
Portland during 2003 were 0.456% higher in attendance zones where NCLB scores were 
1% higher.  The elasticity is very similar for school districts in Philadelphia (column 3).  
Notice that Philadelphia is one of four areas to have a significant increase in the price elas-
ticity.  It increased from 0.481 in 2003 to 0.710 in 2007 (0.481 + 0.229).  Overall, panel A 
provides tentative evidence that (i) NCLB scores capture a dimension of school quality that 
matters for property values and; (ii) the functional relationship between NCLB scores and 
property values changed over the duration of our study.   
<<  Insert Table 3 Around Here >> 
                                                 
35 Our main results are unaffected by using boundary regions of 0.35 or 0.15 miles instead. 
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The evidence in panel A is tentative because we have not controlled for correlation be-
tween school quality and unobserved amenities.  Positive correlation seems likely.  To see 
this, first note that household income is a strong predictor of a child’s academic perfor-
mance.
36
  Now consider a household’s location choice problem.  If homebuyers appreciate 
low crime rates, access to parks, and scenic views, they will bid up prices in neighbor-
hoods with those amenities.  Wealthier parents who can afford to live in high-amenity 
neighborhoods will have children who perform better on standardized tests.  Therefore, our 
inability to control for crime, parks, and views will produce an upward bias on the OLS 
estimator for the test score coefficient.  Boundary fixed effects can mitigate this problem 
by absorbing the price effect of unobserved amenities in each boundary zone. 
Panel B reports regression results after adding boundary fixed effects.  Consistent with 
intuition, the coefficients of variation increase and the test score coefficients decrease.
37
  
Comparing panels A and B reveals that boundary fixed effects decrease most of the elastic-
ities by more than 50%.   
NCLB scores are not directly comparable across states because each state develops its 
                                                 
36 Correlation between household income and academic performance reflects a web of interaction between several underlying factors.  
Income is correlated with parental education and ability which, in turn, may help to explain the quality of the early parenting 
environment.  Income is also correlated with the education and ability of the parents’ of the child’s peers, and so on.  While positive 
correlation between income and test scores is sufficient to develop intuition for the endogeneity problem in our model, understanding the 
underlying causal mechanisms is critical to the development of effective education policies.   See Heckman (2008) for a summary of the 
evidence.  
37 The impact on the test score coefficients of including the boundary fixed effects is quite similar (in percentage terms) to the results 
reported by Black (1999) and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007).  Coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent 
across metro areas with the usual signs and plausible magnitudes. Results are suppressed for brevity and will be provided upon request.  
Like Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan we find that, more often than not, inclusion of the boundary fixed effects decreases the magnitudes 
of the coefficients on neighborhood demographics. 
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own tests.  Nevertheless, since the state-specific scores represent different proxy measures 
of the same underlying variable—school quality—they can be compared in terms of a 
common proportionate change.  The elasticities in columns 6-10 are remarkably similar 
across the five metro areas in 2003.   They suggest a 1% increase in math and reading pro-
ficiency would increase property values by 0.12% to 0.27%.  In comparison, Black (1999) 
reports an increase of 0.42% for Boston in 1993-1995 and the results from Bayer, Ferreira, 
and McMillan (2007) indicate an increase of 0.12% for San Francisco in 1990.   
In 2007 our range of point estimates for the test score elasticity is wider: 0.04 to 0.57.  
These estimates are calculated by summing the baseline coefficient for 2003 and the dif-
ferential for 2007.  The changes are large and significant for Fairfax, Portland, Detroit, and 
Los Angeles.  Several factors may be contributing to these changes, including: (i) changes 
in NCLB scores; (ii) changes in wealth as housing values and assets grew during the hous-
ing boom; (iii) the information shock created by the format for tracking performance under 
the NCLB program; (iv) changes in neighborhood demographics; (v) changes in other 
housing characteristics that serve as substitutes or complements for school quality; and (vi) 
changes in the stock of housing.  Parsing out the relative importance of these and other po-
tential contributing factors would require estimating a demand system for school quality 
and other attributes of houses and neighborhoods—a challenge that we leave for future re-
search.
38
  Regardless of what drives the temporal instability of the hedonic price function, 
the large changes in the test score coefficients signal that the hedonic gradient changed, 
violating TCGA.  Moreover, changes in other coefficients are large enough to reject the 
                                                 
38 See Epple (1987), Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), and Kuminoff, Smith, and Timmins (2013) for an overview of the 
challenges with hedonic demand estimation.   
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hypothesis of a time-constant gradient for every metro area (F-tests are reported in panel 
B).  Philadelphia is the only area with a p-value near the 0.05 threshold.  These results 
clearly indicate the presence of conflation bias. 
6.2.  Capitalization Effects Measured Over 5-Year Intervals 
To assess the magnitude of conflation bias, we use capitalization effects to calculate an-
other set of test score elasticities.  We regress price changes on changes in test scores, 
treating the average house in each block group as an observation.
39
  The control variables 
include changes in tax rates, changes in the characteristics of residents living in each block 
group, and changes in the physical characteristics of the average house sold within the 
block group.  Differencing the data purges omitted characteristics of block groups that are 
constant between 2003 and 2007.   
Panel C of table 3 reports results based on the full sample of block groups.  Los Angeles 
is the only area where the capitalization effect implies an elasticity (0.17%) within the 
range defined by the parameters of the 2003 and 2007 price functions (0.14% to 0.22%).  
In Fairfax, Portland, Philadelphia, and Detroit, the capitalization effects are far below the 
lower bound of point estimates from single year price functions.  The implied elasticity is 
at least positive and marginally significant in Philadelphia.  In Fairfax and Portland, the 
elasticities are close to zero.  In Detroit the estimated capitalization effect is negative and 
marginally significant.  This could reflect specification error in the linear form of the esti-
                                                 
39 As noted earlier, there are too few repeat sales to support a micro data analysis.  Our use of block group averages provides greater 
resolution than recent studies that defined the unit of observation as a census tract median or a county average (Chay and Greenstone 
2005, Greenstone and Gallagher 2008, Baum-Snow and Marion 2009).     
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mating equation, but the hedonic estimates in column 9 seem plausible by contrast.
40
       
One might worry that the results in panel C are confounded by omitted variables.  As we 
noted earlier, schools with lower test scores in 2003 tended to experience larger increases 
in test scores.  These increases may not be exogenous.  If changes in unobserved attributes 
of block groups are negatively correlated with changes in scores, then our estimators for 
capitalization effects may be biased downward.  Recall that we control for changes in 
property taxes and changes in observable characteristics of block group populations.  This 
means that any confounding must come from changes in unobserved variables that co-vary 
with changes in NCLB scores across the block groups within a metro area (e.g. crime 
rates).  While this is certainly possible, it seems unlikely that localized amenities (other 
than school quality) would change sharply as we cross an attendance zone boundary.  
Based on this logic, adding boundary fixed effects to the regression will mitigate potential 
confounding by absorbing the capitalization of changes in all unobserved variables that are 
common to both sides of a 0.2-mile boundary zone.    
 To implement our panel data version of the boundary discontinuity design we first drop 
all houses located more than 0.2 miles from a boundary.  Then we aggregate the micro data 
on either side of each boundary.  Finally, we add fixed effects for each boundary zone and 
                                                 
40 As an exploratory exercise, we repeated the estimation using a Oaxaca decomposition that added baseline test scores as controls: 
  hggp 12 .  This specification replaces the assumption that 0  with the assumption that 
  0| 1  gE  .  Doing so improved our results for Fairfax and Detroit.  The implied test score elasticities were positive and 
significant for Fairfax in 2007 and Detroit in 2003 and 2007, though they still understated our preferred estimates from panel B by 45% 
to 62%.  However, results for the other three metro areas were statistically insignificant, making it difficult for us to draw general 
conclusions about the relative performances of the two models.  Investigating Oaxaca-type extensions of the standard capitalization 
model would be an interesting area for further research.        
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estimate the resulting first-differenced model,   
(18)                                                     .     
This specification uses the same geography and the same fixed effects as the cross-section 
regressions.  If changes in omitted variables are negatively correlated with changes in test 
scores, then we would expect the capitalization effects to increase.  Results are reported in 
panel D.  While standard errors on the capitalization-based elasticities have increased due 
to the decrease in sample size and the inclusion of fixed effects, the point estimates are 
very similar to our baseline results.  The estimates in columns 16-20 all fall within 95% 
confidence intervals of the estimates from columns 11-15.  Thus, we do not find strong ev-
idence of confounding from time-varying omitted variables.   
Overall, comparing the results in panels A and C of table 3 (without boundary fixed ef-
fects) and comparing the results in panels B and D (with boundary fixed effects) suggests 
that the price function gradients changed over time and that these changes created wedges 
between capitalization effects and hedonic price function parameters. We ran additional 
robustness checks to investigate the possibility that these wedges are influenced by aggre-
gation bias (moving from micro data to block groups or boundary zones) and/or sample 
selection bias (moving from the full metro area to 0.2 mile boundary zones) and found evi-
dence against both explanations.  Details are provided in the online appendix. 
6.3.  Implications for Welfare Measurement 
The results from our single-year regressions suggest that hedonic price functions adjust-
ed to changes in housing market conditions.  These changes matter for evaluating the bene-
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fits of public education.  Table 4 provides a summary comparison between hedonic and 
capitalization based estimates for the average resident’s willingness to pay for a 1% in-
crease in NCLB scores.  Each column reports the MWTP predicted by a specific model, 
averaged over the samples from all five study regions.  In columns 1-3 we do not control 
for omitted variables.  The resulting predictions are fairly robust to how we define a data 
point (house, block group) and how we define the extent of the market (full metro area, 0.2 
mile boundary zone).  However, these predictions are twice as large as predictions from 
models using boundary fixed effects to mitigate confounding (column 4).   
<<  Insert Table 4 Around Here >> 
The boundary discontinuity design in column 4 is our preferred specification.  It miti-
gates confounding; it controls for race-based sorting; and it predicts MWTP using data for 
a single school year, which seems consistent with the static description of equilibrium in 
Rosen’s model.  It implies the average household would have been willing to pay $536 
(year 2000 dollars) for a 1% improvement in school quality in 2003.  Looking across metro 
areas, average MWTP ranges from $422 for Detroit to $743 for Philadelphia.  This range 
lies within the range of estimates for San Francisco ($372) and Boston ($917) reported by 
Black and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan.           
There were several changes to housing markets between 2003 and 2007.  Property val-
ues increased by 6% on average, test scores increased by 10% on average, and there were 
smaller changes in the demographic compositions of neighborhoods.  There was also 
steady media coverage of the NCLB program and changes to the national economy that 
would have affected expectations about future wealth (e.g. rapid growth in stock market 
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indices and personal income).  These changes were accompanied by changes in hedonic 
gradients which, in turn, increased our prediction for average MWTP to $688 in 2007.      
In contrast, capitalization effects suggest much smaller measures of MWTP.  Column 5 
reports the average MWTP predicted by the simple first-differenced model ($134 in 2003, 
$152 in 2007).
41
  These figures are about ¼ the size of estimates from single-year bounda-
ry discontinuity regressions!  The difference only narrows slightly when boundary fixed 
effects are used to mitigate confounding by time-varying omitted variables (column 6).  
Overall, these results seem to confirm the predictions from our theoretical and econometric 
models.  Shocks to the spatial distribution of public goods and changes in market funda-
mentals cause the hedonic price function to adjust, driving a wedge between capitalization 
effects and welfare measures. 
7. Conclusion 
Rosen’s (1974) static hedonic model provides a starting point for developing revealed 
preference estimates of the willingness to pay for public goods and externalities.  A recent 
wave of empirical research has sought to improve the credibility of these estimates by re-
fining conventional research designs to mitigate confounding by omitted variables.  The 
leading strategy uses panel data to identify how exogenous shocks to public goods are cap-
italized into property values.  Unfortunately, credible estimates for capitalization effects do 
not generally provide credible measures of consumer welfare.  We have shown that mov-
ing to a capitalization framework changes the economic interpretation of the identified pa-
                                                 
41 These figures were calculated by combining results from columns 11-15 in table 3 with data on average property values and 
populations in tables 2 and A3-A6. 
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rameters.  This change occurs when the price function adjusts to clear the market following 
shocks to the distributions of public goods, preferences, wealth, or technology.  Capitaliza-
tion effects conflate these temporal adjustments to the price function with the spatial price 
differentials of hedonic equilibria.  Our application suggests the resulting bias can be seri-
ous, causing capitalization effects to understate the willingness to pay for improved school 
quality by as much as 75%.    
Conflation bias is a potential problem for any panel data estimator that ignores temporal 
changes in the economic parameters of the underlying cross-section model.  For example, 
Banzhaf and Walsh (2013) use a Oaxaca decomposition to characterize conflation bias in 
differences-in-differences estimates for the effect of changes in public goods on the racial 
composition of neighborhoods.  Their simulation illustrates how a standard program evalu-
ation model can fail to identify the correct sign of a policy-relevant parameter. 
A key challenge for future research is to develop research designs that mitigate endoge-
neity problems without undermining the economic interpretations of the identified parame-
ters.  One strategy is to carefully model the mechanisms that cause variables to be endoge-
nous within a well posed structural model of the sorting process (e.g. Epple, Romano, and 
Sieg 2006, Ferreyra 2007).  Another option is to adapt tools from the program evaluation 
literature to refine the design of a structural sorting model (e.g. Bayer, Ferreira, and 
McMillan 2007, Galiani, Murphy, and Pantano 2012).  A third possibility is to refine the 
econometric tools of the program evaluation literature to mitigate omitted variable bias in a 
way that maintains a consistent link to an equilibrium description of the structural model.  
Our application to valuing public school quality illustrates how this can be done.  We sus-
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pect that similar approaches can be adapted to provide more credible hedonic measures of 
the willingness to pay for other public goods and externalities.   
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SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SCHOOL TEST SCORE DIFFERENCES 
 
NOTE.—Means and standard deviations for test scores are based on NCLB information aggregated and reported by www.schooldatadirect.org.  The math read-
ing score is an overall measure (calculated by Standard & Poor’s) that provides an average of the proficiency rates achieved across all reading and math tests, 
weighted by the number of tests taken for each elementary school (Fairfax and Portland) or school district (Philly, Detroit and LA).  Raw scores are not directly 
comparable across states because each state develops its own standardized tests. 
 
 
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
2002/2003 math-reading score 81.88 10.44 79.35 11.34 67.43 13.19 67.17 11.39 45.73 17.34
Changes in math-reading score 
10th decile 11.35 8.03 1.45 9.22 18.78 0.80 15.08 2.43 10.60 3.26
middle deciles 0.62 5.02 -4.02 6.61 10.45 4.85 11.15 2.78 9.24 2.01
90th decile -0.44 2.79 -4.50 4.07 6.28 1.36 5.13 1.72 5.97 1.51
% change in 10th decile
LOS ANGELES, 
CA
13.87% 1.83% 27.85% 22.46% 23.18%
FAIRFAX,                   
VA









SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR HOUSING, NEIGHBORHOODS, AND TEST SCORES IN FAIRFAX, VA 
 
NOTE.—This table reports summary statistics for the key variables included in the analysis for Fairfax, VA.  Cols. 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 are simply the means and 
standard deviations for the 3 different samples of data.  The boundary zone sample includes all houses located within 0.20 miles of the boundary of another 
school attendance zone.  Col. 4 reports the difference in means between houses located on the “high” test score side of a boundary with the corresponding mean 
for the “low” test score houses on the opposite side of the boundary.  Col. 5 provides a T-statistic on the difference in these means.  Cols. 8 and 9 report correla-
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in means: 
high score 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sale price         -0.02
2003 price 567,322 247,727 546,575 -3,036 -0.40 571,742 226,270 0.06
2007 price 562,683 305,748 542,998 14,512 1.36 599,474 268,952
Average math/reading test result     
2003 score 83.56 9.54 83.01 8.91 38.67 82.86 9.25 -0.49
2007 score 84.36 8.25 83.90 5.11 24.81 83.92 8.17
Housing characteristics:  
square feet (100's) 21.12 9.93 20.66 0.07 0.26 21.32 7.06 0.01 -0.02
bathrooms 3.24 1.08 3.21 0.00 -0.10 3.24 0.72 0.00 -0.05
age 34.07 15.82 34.13 0.89 2.13 35.21 12.63 0.04 -0.02
lot acres 0.38 0.43 0.35 0.00 -0.51 0.43 0.42 0.07 0.04
bedrooms 3.94 0.77 3.93 0.03 1.56 3.92 0.36 -0.03 -0.08
Neighborhood characteristics:  
% block group nonwhite 0.23 0.11 0.23 -0.02 -6.89 0.24 0.12 0.16 -0.12
% block group under 18 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.00 -0.82 0.23 0.03 -0.04 0.07
% block group owner occupied 0.85 0.15 0.84 0.00 0.08 0.81 0.18 -0.18 0.00
% block group vacant 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -2.06 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.04
block group pop density 0.37 0.22 0.40 0.00 0.77 0.39 0.26 0.06 -0.11
tax rate 111.85 49.52 111.45 -0.30 -0.28 117.30 38.00 -0.08
Fairfax County, VA
Full Sample                          
( micro data: N = 10,255 )
Sample: 0.20 Mile Boundary Zone                                                  
( micro data: N = 5,843 )
Full Sample                                            




TEST SCORE COEFFICIENTS FROM HEDONIC AND CAPITALIZATION REGRESSIONS 
 
NOTE.—All regressions use Eicker-White standard errors and include controls for property taxes, physical 
housing characteristics (square feet, number of bathrooms, age, lot size, number of bedrooms) and neighbor-
hood characteristics measured at the block group level (population density, percent nonwhite, percent under 
18, percent owner occupied, and percent vacant).  In cols. 1 through 10, the dependent variable is the natural 
log of the sale price of the house.  All control variables are interacted with a dummy for sales made during the 
2007-2008 school year.  In cols. 11 through 20 the dependent variable is the change in the natural log of the 
average sale price in a census block group or a 0.2 mile boundary zone.  See the text for additional details.   
 
FAIRFAX,                
VA








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.122 0.456 0.481 0.524 0.274
(0.027) (0.020) (0.045) (0.036) (0.012)
0.554 0.034 0.229 0.516 0.084
(0.056) (0.032) (0.067) (0.086) (0.023)
R
2
0.74 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.75
Number of observations 6,036 14,443 3,973 6,252 12,287
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.116 0.200 0.272 0.208 0.140
(0.040) (0.028) (0.071) (0.047) (0.015)
0.293 -0.165 -0.120 0.357 0.075
(0.081) (0.048) (0.101) (0.126) (0.028)
R
2
0.85 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.85
Number of observations 6,036 14,443 3,973 6,252 12,287
F-test on H0: time-constant gradient 4.69 1.98 1.86 4.41 8.22
p-value on F-test 0.000 0.031 0.047 0.000 0.000
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
-0.037 0.007 0.116 -0.289 0.174
(0.073) (0.096) (0.068) (0.134) (0.033)
R
2
0.53 0.45 0.29 0.21 0.18
Number of observations 438 754 1,199 1,477 6,975
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
0.008 -0.025 0.130 -0.445 0.231
(0.111) (0.091) (0.180) (0.521) (0.177)
R
2
0.83 0.82 0.91 0.87 0.83
Number of observations 404 603 176 213 251
D.  Test Score Parameters from Capitalization Regressions                                                         
(boundary zone data from 0.2 mile sample with boundary fixed effects)
change in log (test score)
change in log (test score)
log (test score), 2003 coefficient
log (test score), 2007 differential
A.  Test Score Parameters from Hedonic Regressions                                      
(micro data from 0.2 mile boundary sample without boundary fixed effects)
B.  Test Score Parameters from Hedonic Regressions                                      
(micro data from 0.2 mile boundary sample with boundary fixed effects)
C.  Test Score Parameters from Capitalization Regressions                                                                
(block group data from full sample without boundary fixed effects)
log (test score), 2003 coefficient




IMPACT OF IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY ON ESTIMATES FOR THE AVERAGE  
RESIDENT’S WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR A 1% INCREASE IN TEST SCORES  
 
NOTE.—All measures of willingness to pay are reported in constant year 2000 dollars.  Each measure is averaged 
over the samples from our five study regions, using the elasticities reported in tables 3 and A1.  For example, the 
estimates in col. 4 are based on the elasticities reported in cols. 6 through 10 of table 3.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimates for willingness to pay:       
2003 school year 1,238 1,222 1,041 536 134 169
2007 school year 1,685 1,572 1,660 688 152 190
Identification strategy:       
Model hedonic hedonic hedonic hedonic capitalization capitalization
Sample full full 0.2 mile 0.2 mile full 0.2 mile
Data point block group house house house block group boundary zone
Sample size 23,149 244,551 42,991 42,991 10,843 1,665
Controls for omitted variables none none none




boundary                    
fixed effects
